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CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER
THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE
The criminal conspiracy sections of the 1973 Pennsylvania
Crimes Code1 are a new attempt to more adequately define an
imprecise area of the law2 formerly treated by the general con-
spiracy provision of the 1939 Penal Code.3 The new Code's most
significant improvements lie in its overall concern with striking
a balance between protecting the rights of the individual while
safeguarding those of society, its definitiveness as to what consti-
tutes the crime of conspiracy, its unilateral approach to conspira-
torial conduct, its inclusion of the overt act as an element of the
offense, its attention to the procedural complexities inherent in a
conspiracy prosecution, and its more reasonable approach of grad-
ing the punishment for conspiracy according to the crime planned
as the object of that conspiracy.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
Originally, the crime of conspiracy was created for a quite
explicit purpose. The Ordinance of Conspirators of 13054 sought
to prohibit combinations aimed at falsely and maliciously indicting
innocent persons:
Conspirators be they that do confeder or bind themselves
by oath or covenant or other alliance that every of them
shall aid and sustain the enterprise of the other falsely
and maliciously to indict or cause to be indicted, or falsely
to acquit people, or falsely to move or maintain pleas....
Furthermore, in the fourteenth century, the crime of conspiracy
to procure a false indictment was not complete until the person
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 903-06 (Supp. 1973).
2. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1948) (Jack-
son, J., concurring): "The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it al-
most defies definition."
3. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 302, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973):
Conspiracy to do unlawful act:
Any two persons who falsely and maliciously conspire and agree
to cheat and defraud any person of his moneys, goods, chat-
tels, or other property, or do any other dishonest, malicious, or
unlawful act to the prejudice of another, are guilty of conspiracy,
a misdemeanor, and on conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or undergo imprison-
ment, by separate or solitary confinement at labor or by simple
imprisonment, not exceeding two (2) years, or both.
4. 33 Edw. 1 (1305).
falsely accused had been actually indicted and acquitted.5 It was
not until the sixteenth century that the inflexibility of such
a requirement was relaxed. It was then decided that false ac-
cusers might be subject to a common law indictment for conspira-
cy even though the grand jury had failed to indict the individual
they had falsely charged. 6 The Court of Star Chamber con-
firmed this doctrine in 1611, in Poulterers' Case,7 holding that the
combination or confederacy was the gist of the offense, not the
subsequent indictment and acquittal. As the emphasis had now
been shifted from the outcome of the combination to the combina-
tion per se, the conspiracy agreement could be prosecuted even
though its purpose had not yet been accomplished.
The common law thereafter expanded the grounds for a con-
spiracy prosecution, hitherto confined to conspiracy to procure a
false indictment, by making it an offense to conspire to commit
any crime.8 This expansion took on a more vigorous note and, by
the nineteenth century, it was generally accepted that a conspirator
could be prosecuted without the acts contemplated by the conspir-
acy being criminal in themselves.9 Through judicial extension,
the crime of conspiracy was thus gradually transformed from its
rather restricted definition in the Ordinance of Conspirators of
1305 to the vague and overbroad principle of our own day.10
II. CRMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER THE 1939 PENNsYLVANIA
PENAL CODE
The general criminal conspiracy section" of the 1939 Pennsyl-
vania Penal Code embodied the broad and vague concept of crim-
inal conspiracy derived from the later development of the common
law. Under that section, not only was it an offense to conspire to
accomplish criminal acts,' 2 but there was a general prohibition
5. See Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARv. L. REV. 393, 397 (1922)
[hereinafter cited as SAYRE]. E.g., FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM, 114 D
(1677) which restates the fourteenth century principle:
A Writ of Conspiracy lieth where two, three or more persons
of malice and covin do conspire and devise to indict any person
falsely, and afterwards he who is indicated is acquitted; now he
shall have this Writ of Conspiracy against them who so indicted
him.
For an extensive scholarly treatment of the subiect, see also 3 SELDEN
SOCIETY, SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH UNDER EDWARD I,
liv-lxxi (1939).
6. Sydenham v. Keilaway, Cro. Jac. 7 (1574).
7.' 9 Coke 55b (1611).
8. See Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 342-43
(1947); Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HAny. L. REV. 920, 923 (1959).
9. See HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 446 (8th ed. 1824).
10. See SAYRE, supra note 5, at 398. See also note 2 supra.
11. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 302, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973). For text of same see note 3 supra.
12. At an earlier period of the common law, the crime of conspiracy
was restricted to prosecuting confederations formed to carry out criminal
acts. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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against conspiracy agreements to do "any . . dishonest, malicious
or unlawful act to the prejudice of another."'u
The 1939 general criminal conspiracy provision was a codifica-
tion of the common law attempt to counter the public danger
which conspiracy represented. The common law had come to
realize that even though the purpose of the conspiracy might have
failed or never been accomplished, there was a general danger to
society inherent in the very combination. 14 By joining with
others to carry out a criminal purpose, not only had a defendant
manifested his criminal intent,15 but he had thereby made it
more likely that such purpose would be carried out and be far
more difficult to prevent.'6 Indeed, the conspiracy itself was
said to be more dangerous than "the mere commission of the con-
templated crime."' 7 By uniting with others in the scheme, the
individual defendant had substantially increased the dangers to
society: not only was there a greater likelihood that some harm
would be forthcoming, but also that such harm would probably be
more severe than had only one person been involved in its perpe-
tration.' 8 Furthermore, once an individual had conspired with
13. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 302, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (re-
pealed 1973). For text of same see note 3 supra. The 1939 Code contains
another conspiracy section which, both in wording and in scope, is an em-
bodiment of the earliest period of the development of the concept of crimi-
nal conspiracy. Thus the Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 301, [1939] Pa.
Laws 872 (repealed 1973) makes it a felony to prosecute falsely:
Conspiracy to arrest or indict:
Any two or more persons who conspire or agree falsely and ma-
liciously, to charge or indict any other person, or cause or procure
him to be charged or indicted, in any court of criminal jurisdic-
tion, are guilty of conspiracy, a felony, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding two thou-
sand dollars ($2,000), or to imprisonment not exceeding five (5)
years, or both.
Neither § 301 nor § 302 of the 1939 Act interfered with the indictment and
punishment of common law conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Mack, 111 Pa.
Super. 494, 170 A. 429 (1934) (false indictment for unlawful sale of liquor).
Thus, while no indictment for conspiracy to bribe and corrupt councilmen
can be brought under § 302, an indictment at common law will lie. Com-
monwealth v. Richardson, 229 Pa. 609, 611, 79 A. 222 (1911).
14. See Commonwealth v. Rosen, 141 Pa. Super. 272, 14 A.2d 833
(1940) (conspiracy to set up and maintain a gambling house).
15. To authorize conviction for conspiracy, parties to the unlawful
agreement must be actuated by criminal intent. Commonwealth v. Kel-
son, 134 Pa. Super. 132, 3 A.2d 933 (1939) (conspiracy to maliciously destroy
another's property by explosives).
16. See PERKINs, CRIMINAL LAW 614 (1957).
17. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (conspiracy
to violate the Bankruptcy Act).
18. See Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HAhv. L. REV. 920, 924 (1959).
others, the pressures of the group might act to keep him from re-
nouncing his criminal intent and repudiating his commitment.1 9
Also, the mere fact that a conspiracy was created for one purpose
did not mean that it would dissolve when that purpose was ac-
complished. The conspiracy might serve as a continuing focal
point for further crimes.20 It was because of this general danger
to society that modern common law and legislation derived
therefrom became broader in scope, condemning not only con-
federacies to commit crimes, but even confederacies to do anything
"dishonest, malicious or unlawful."
'21
But, in seeking to protect the rights of society-at-large, the
draftsmen of the 1939 Code have arguably neglected the rights of
the individual defendant. Terms such as "dishonest," "malici-
ous" and "unlawful," although broad enough to encompass almost
every act that might conceivably prove "harmful" to society, are
at the same instance too vague to afford adequate protection to the
accused. Predictability is one of the essential attributes of all
law.22 Vague conspiracy statutes, such as that in the 1939 Code,
undermine both the predictability as to what constitutes the crime
of conspiracy and the objectivity with which the courts are to ap-
ply the law. Absent precision in statutory draftsmanship, deci-
sions become more subjective and judges must substitute their
"individual standards and prejudices" in place of the vagueness of
19. See Note, Criminal Conspiracy: Bearing of Overt Acts upon the
Nature of the Crime, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1924) which states:
The reason for punishing conspiracy is thus observed to lie in
the fact that the very existence of such design has a dangerous
potency of evil for the community. In the individual conspirator,
it produces a two-fold state of mind: a reliance on the coopera-
tion of his associates, which creates a greater likelihood of crimi-
nal conduct on his part, and an intent to support his associates
morally and actively in the future. The latter leads to action on
his part directly.
20. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915).
21. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 302, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (re-
pealed 1973). See note 3 supra. See also HAWKI S, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
446 (8th ed. 1824).
22. It is perhaps this more than any other factor which makes
justice according to law preferable to justice without law....
The excellence of justice according to law, or judicial justice, rests
upon the fact that judges are not free to render decisions based
purely upon personal predilections and peculiar dispositions, no
matter how good or how wise they may be; they are bound by
principles embodying the accumulated wisdom and experience of
past ages, and those principles furnish a fixed standard by which
citizens of the state may measure or shape their conduct and by
which the course of justice can be reasonably foreseen and pre-
dicted. Once rob the law of this predictability, and the state re-
verts to a government by men rather than by law. No one will be
seru e in nis or her interests or rights, for no one can foretell
what interests individual judges may see fit to protect or to dis-
regard. If the criminal law permits judges to determine criminal-
ity by their own individual standards and prejudices, we must
face again the anxious fears and troubled insecurity of the old Star
Chamber days; decisions will lose their predictability, and the law
will obviously cease to protect.




Vaguely drafted general conspiracy statutes unfairly tip the
scales of justice in favor of the prosecution. Mr. Justice Jackson,
concurring in Krulewitch v. United States,24 described the predic-
ament of the defendant:
When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of
the conspiracy strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should
first establish prima facie the conspiracy and identify the
conspirators, after which evidence of acts and declarations
of each in the course of its execution are admissible against
all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a charge is
difficult for a judge to control. As a practical matter,
the accused often is confronted with a hodgepodge of acts
and statements by others which he may never have autho-
rized or intended or even known about, but which help to
persuade the jury of the existence of the conspiracy itself.
In other words, a conspiracy often is proved by evidence
that is admissible only upon the assumption that prejudi-
cial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury,
which all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion (citations omitted).
Little wonder that modern-day conspiracy has been called "the
darling of the modem prosecutor's nursery" 25 and a "drag-net
device capable of perversion into an instrument of injustice. '26
Thus two conflicting policies must be resolved in order to
draft an effective, yet equitable, conspiracy statute. On the one
hand, the statute must be broad enough to guard society against
the general danger inherent in the conspiratorial agreement; 27
on the other hand, it must be precisely drawn to insure the rights
of the individual defendant.2 8 The 1939 Code failed in the latter
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rothenberger, 32 Pa. D. & C. 682
(Q.S. 1938) where a conspiracy conviction was upheld when a group of
persons let air out of the tires of heavy trucks.
24. 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1948) (conspiracy to transport a woman across
state lines for purposes of prostitution in violation of the Mann Act).
See also Commonwealth v. Moyer, 52 Pa. Super. 548 (1913) (conspiracy to
embezzle).
25. Learned Hand, J., in Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263
(2d Cir. 1925) (conspiracy to sell cocaine in violation of the Harrison Act).
See also Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOK. L. Rv.
1 (1957); Comment, Criminal Law: The Conspiracy Hearsay Exception
and Its Erratic Application, 76 DICK. L. REV. 728 (1972).
26. Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 572 (1950) (conspiracy to willfully advocate the overthrow or
destruction of the Government of the United States in violation of the
Smith Act).
27. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text supra.
28. See SAYRE, supra note 5, at 413.
regard by using vague and overbroad terms, leading to unpredicta-
bility and judicial subjectivity in defining the crime and its
scope.
29
III. CRnINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER THE 1973 PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMES CODE
The criminal conspiracy sections of the 1973 Pennsylvania
Crimes Code3" attempt to correct the inadequacies of the 1939
Code. Patterned after the Model Penal Code,3' the Crimes Code
is a conscious effort to redress the balance between protecting
the rights of the accused while safeguarding those of society.
8 2
Such an enactment was long overdue in order to stop the vigor-
ous and unbridled expansion that the concept of criminal conspir-
acy had enjoyed since the seventeenth century.3 3 The Supreme
Court in Grunewald v. United States,34 had already warned that
29. See Note, The Objects of Criminal Conspiracy-Inadequacies of
State Law, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1060 (1960). Broad language in conspir-
acy statutes may come perilously close to violating due process guaran-
tees in the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. A
California statute to prohibit combinations "to pervert or obstruct justice"
was held valid in Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 49, 216 P.2d 859
(1950). A Utah statute, however, outlawing agreements to commit acts
"injurious . . . to public morals," was held invalid in State v. Musser,
118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 903-06 (Supp. 1973).
31. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.03-5.06 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The
changes regarding the conspiracy provisions are minute, especially
when compared to the wholesale deletion of Model Code text which may be
seen lacking in the criminal attempt (§ 901) and criminal solicitation
(§ 902) sections in the new Pennsylvania Code. Under the 1973 Code:
"A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific
crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
commission of that crime." Whereas the Model Penal Code, in § 5.01
gives a list of seven types of conduct "strongly corroborative of the actor's
criminal purpose," the Pennsylvania version deletes this list entirely, there-
by leaving open-ended what kind of conduct is necessary to infer that pur-
pose. Likewise, the Model Penal Code, in § 5.02 provides:
Uncommunicated solicitation. It is immaterial under Subsec-
tion (1) of this section [definition of solicitation] that the actor
fails to communicate with the person he solicits to commit a crime
if his conduct was designed to effect such communication.
Again, this section is wholly absent from the provision on criminal
solicitation in the Pennsylvania code, presumably because the Pennsyl-
vania draftsmen did not wish to punish that conduct, which formerly
amounted only to attempted solicitation, with the same penalties now
prescribed for the actual solicitation.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104 (Supp. 1973) provides:
Purposes:
The general purposes of this title are:
(1) To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably inflicts or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interest.
(3) To safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or
arbitrary punishment.
33. See Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 342-43
(1947).
34. 353 U.S. 391, 404 (1956) (conspiracy to defraud United States by
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it would "view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already per-
vasive and wide-sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions."
The 1973 Code presents a comprehensive response to this
problem of balancing the rights of the accused with those of
society. It is more precise in explaining what constitutes the
crime of conspiracy.3 5 It chooses a unilateral, rather than a
group approach in determining what amounts to conspiratorial
conduct. 6 An extra measure of protection is provided the accused
by requiring that an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy be
alleged and proved as an element of the offense.3 7 Greater atten-
tion is also paid to procedural areas untouched in the 1939 provi-
sion.38 Finally, the new code protects offenders from excessive,
disproportionate or arbitrary punishment by grading the penalty
to fit the crime which was the object of the conspiracy.
39
A. Only Conspiracies to Commit Crimes are Punishable
Whereas the 1939 Code condemned as conspiracies agree-
ments to do "any . . . dishonest, malicious or unlawful act,
' ' 40
the new code prohibits only conspiracies to commit a crime. 41 This
change should alleviate the problem of predicting what consti-
tutes the offense of conspiracy. 42 Instead of having to rely on
preventing criminal prosecution of certain taxpayers for fraudulent tax
evasion). This statement stands out in marked contrast to one made by
Justice Gibson in an early Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Mifflin v.
Commonwealth, 5 W. & S. 461, 464 (Pa. 1843) (conspiracy to effect the es-
cape of an infant) that conspiracy was
Never invoked except as a corrective of disorder which would else
be without one, and as a curb to the immoderate power to do mis-
chief which is gained by a combination of the means.
Apparently, the crime of conspiracy had expanded greatly in the hundred
or so years intervening.
35. See text accompanying notes 40-45 infra.
36. See text accompanying notes 46-69 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 70-86 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 87-92 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 93-100 infra.
40. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 302, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973). See note 3 supra.
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 903 (a) (Supp. 1973):
Definition of conspiracy.-A person is guilty of conspiracy
with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the in-
tent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one
or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such
crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the plan-
ning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation
to commit such crime.
42. Id.§ 104(4):
The general purposes of this title are:
judicial subjectivity in determining whether a particular act is
"dishonest," "malicious" or "unlawful," all vague and ambigu-
ous terms, the courts need only look to the statute books.43 The
1973 Crimes Code specifically states that all common law crimes
are abolished. 44  While there may be other objects, not criminal
per se, that should be treated as criminal when engaged in by a
group, these should be dealt with in special conspiracy provi-
sions, so as not to befog the clarity and precision of the general
conspiracy provision.46 In this way the predictability and effec-
tiveness of the general provision is preserved.
B. The Unilateral Approach to Conspiratorial Conduct
Another way in which the new code restores an element of
predictability to the crime of conspiracy is by taking a unilateral
approach to conspiratorial conduct. In determining the culpability
of the single participant the Crimes Code focuses attention on the
conduct of that individual, rather than emphasize the conduct
of the conspiratorial group.40 By specifically denoting the acts
and intent required for a conspiracy indictment, the 1973 Code
has sought to remedy the prejudicial effects of the mass conspir-
acy trial,47 so vividly described by Mr. Justice Jackson in his con-
curring opinion in Krulewitch v. United States. 48 By stressing the
conduct of the individual rather than that of the group, "the hodge-
podge of acts and statements" of an accused's co-defendants should
now be less likely to impair his image in the eyes of the jury.
Illustrative of the Crimes Code's unilateral approach to con-
spiratorial conduct are its provisions pertaining to the definition
(4) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to
constitute an offense, and of the sentences that may be imposed on
conviction of an offense.
43. Id. § 106 provides a general rule as to what constitutes a crime
and then enumerates the various classes of crimes under this title, from
"murder of the first degree" to a "misdemeanor of the third degree."
The general rule states simply:
An offense defined by this title for which a sentence of death or
of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime.
44. Id. § 107(b) provides:
Common law crimes abolished.-No conduct constitutes a crime
unless it is a crime under this title or another statute of this
Commonwealth.
This is a significant change from the 1939 Code, which did not interfere
with the indictment and punishment of common law conspiracy. See
note 13 supra.
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE at 103 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 903 (a) (b) (c) (Supp. 1973).
47. Id. § 104(5) provides:
The general purposes of this title are:
(5) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and
minor offenses, and to differentiate among offenders with a view
to a just individualization in their treatment (emphasis added).




of criminal conspiracy, the scope of the conspiratorial relationship,
conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives, renunciation of crim-
inal intent, duration of the conspiracy, and incapacity, irrespon-
sibility or immunity of a party to the conspiracy.
49
The new subsection5" on the duration of the conspiracy is
particularly representative of this unilateral approach. Its purpose
is to isolate the point at which the conspiracy terminates for the
individual actor, so that he may not be held liable for the later
acts of his co-conspirators. But mere abandonment of the agree-
ment is not enough. The conspiracy is not terminated as to the in-
dividual conspirator until he has advised those with whom he con-
spired of his abandonment or informs the authorities of the exist-
ence of the conspiracy and his participation therein.51 Whereas
this may appear to place on onerous burden on the individual con-
spirator, it is a deserved one. Having substantially increased the
general danger to society by entering into a criminal agreement,
52
he should be held liable for the acts of his co-conspirators resulting
therefrom, 3 unless he can make some affirmative effort to aban-
don the agreement prior to the consummation of those acts. The
burden is also a defined one. The individual conspirator now
knows precisely what he must do in order to have the conspir-
acy terminated as to him. Predictability is thus restored,54 and the
rights of the individual are thereby afforded greater protection in
the long run. Also, by showing the person how to terminate his
involvement in the conspiracy, he is encouraged to stop and avoid
additional liability.
55
The new code also permits the limited affirmative defense
of renunciation of criminal intent.5 6 This is indicative of the
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 903(a) (b) (c) (f) (g) and 904 (Supp.
1973).
50. Id. § 903(g).
51. Id. § 903(g) (3).
52. See Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72
HARv. L. REV. 920, 924 (1959).
53. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160, 189 A.2d 255 (1963)
(conspiracy to commit robbery); Commonwealth v. Antico, 146 Pa. Super.
293, 22 A.2d 204 (1941) (conspiracy to illegally procure place on ballot for
candidates of a political body in violation of Election Code).
54. See SAYRE, supra note 5, at 412.
55. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369-70 (1912) (conspiracy
to obtain United States Government land for illegal purposes).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 903 (f) (Supp. 1973). Similar renuncia-
tion provisions are provided in the 1973 Code for criminal attempt (§ 901
(c) ) and criminal solicitation (§ 902(b) ). While the wording may be
different to accord with the modus operandi of the particular crime, the
effect is the same: to provide a defense to the individual defendant where
previously none existed.
code's unilateral approach to conspiratorial conduct as it pro-
vides the individual defendant with a defense previously unavail-
able to him. As the crime of conspiracy was traditionally deemed
complete with the agreement, no subsequent action could exoner-
ate the conspirator of that crime.5 7 However, under the new pro-
vision, if, after conspiring to commit the crime, the actor thwarts
the success of the conspiracy under circumstances manifesting a
voluntary and complete 58 renunciation of his criminal intent, he
is afforded a defense against the charge of conspiracy. As no such
defense existed at common law or in the 1939 Code and judicial
guidelines are therefore lacking, it is still unclear what an actor
must do to "thwart the success of the conspiracy." Timely notifica-
tion of the authorities, which in turn thwarted the conspiracy,
should probably qualify as a renunciation defense, but it would
appear that the quantum of effort required by the actor would
necessarily vary from case to case. Thus it would be impractical,
if not impossible, to lay out all criteria requisite for the defense of
renunciation within the bounds of a general conspiracy statute.59
Another consequence of the Crimes Code's unilateral ap-
proach to conspiratorial conduct is that once the culpability of a
conspirator has been established, it is immaterial to his guilt
that those with whom he conspired have not or cannot be con-
victed.60 Present Pennsylvania law is in accord: the fact that one
of two conspirators has not been arrested6' or cannot be brought
57. See Orear v. United States, 261 F. 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1919) (con-
spiracy to forcibly resist the Selective Service Act); Commonwealth v.
Horvath, 187 Pa. Super. 206, 144 A.2d 489 (1958) (conspiracy to fraudu-
lently convert automobiles).
58. The Model Penal Code does not use the expression "voluntary
and complete" to modify renunciation in any of the attempt, solicitation
or conspiracy provisions allowing for that defense. See MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 5.01(4), 5.02(3), 5.03(6) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The 1973
Pennsylvania Code, however, uses such expression in each of its three re-
nunciation subsections contained in Chapter 9, Inchoate Crimes. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 901(c), 902(b), 903(f) (Supp. 1973). The phrase is
defined in the negative in the new code. Id. § 901(c) (2) provides:
A renunciation is not "voluntary and complete" within the mean-
ing of this subsection if it is motivated in whole or in part by:
(i) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the proba-
bility of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another
participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more diffi-
cult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
(ii) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time
or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another
but similar objective.
By stipulating that the actor's renunciation must be "voluntary and com-
plete," and fully defining that term, the 1973 Code imparts greater predict-
ability both as to what constitutes the crimes of attempt, solicitation and
conspiracy and as to what constitutes the defenses to those crimes.
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE at 144 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 904(a) (2) (Supp. 1973).
61. See Commonwealth v. Salerno, 179 Pa. Super. 13, 116 A.2d 87
(1955) (conspiracy to engage in bookmaking); Commonwealth v. Stam-
baugh, 22 Pa. Super. 386 (1903) (conspiracy to violate a statute guarantee-
ing that a laborer's wages go to his family rather than to his creditors).
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to trial is no bar to the conviction of the other.6 2
Under the new code, incapacity to commit a substantive
crime is also no defense to a conspiracy indictment.63 This is in
accord with the settled rule that a person who is incapable of
committing a substantive crime because he lacks a particular posi-
tion or capacity may nevertheless be guilty of conspiracy to com-
mit that crime.64 The Crimes Code also provides 65 that a person
who may not be convicted of the substantive offense under the law
defining that offense or under its complicity provision6 6 may
not be convicted of the inchoate crime under the general conspir-
acy (or solicitation) provisions. The new code thus rejects the
doctrine, first enunciated in a Pennsylvania case, Shannon v. Com-
monwealth,6 7 but commonly known as Wharton's Rule,6 which
held that:
when to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logi-
cally necessary, conspiracy, which assumes the voluntary
accession of a person to a crime of such nature that it is
aggravated by a plurality of agents cannot be maintained.
Wharton's Rule had been criticized 69 for immunizing from a con-
spiracy prosecution both parties to any offense that inevitably
required concert, thereby disregarding the legislative judgment
that at least one should be punishable and taking no account of
the varying policies that ought to determine whether the other
should be. As such, it is inimical to the unilateral approach to
conspiratorial conduct adopted by the Crimes Code.
C. Overt Act Is Required as Element of Crime of Conspiracy
The Crimes Code provides the accused an extra measure of
protection by requiring that before a conviction will be sustained
an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy must be alleged and
proved to have been done by the accused or by one with whom he
conspired. 70 Such was not the case at common law or under the
1939 Code. It was then unnecessary to aver or prove that any
62. See Commonwealth v. Bonnem, 95 Pa. Super. 496 (1928) (conspir-
acy to defraud investors).
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 904(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
64. See Annot. 131 A.L.R. 1322, 1327-29 (1941).
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 904(b) (Supp. 1973).
66. Id. § 306.
67. 14 Pa. 226 (1850) (conspiracy to commit adultery).
68. See 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1604, at 1862 (12th ed. 1932).
69. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft
No. 10, at 173 (1960).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 903 (e) (Supp. 1973).
overt act had been done in furtherance of the conspiracy to
secure a conviction.71 Under the 1939 Code the overt act bore
merely an evidentiary relationship to the crime of conspiracy.
72
Thus, when such overt acts were proved, they were admitted as
evidence of the unlawful combination and criminal intent, but
the crime was complete even without them, as the unlawful con-
federacy or combination itself was considered to be the gist of
the offense.7 3 By requiring that an overt act be alleged and
proved as an essential element of the criminal conspiracy, the new
code affords at least a minimal added assurance beyond the naked
agreement that a combination dangerous to the public exists.74
An overt act is distinguished from that which rests merely
in intention or design and, as used in the law of conspiracy, has
been interpreted to mean an act done in furtherance of the
conspiracy.75 The act cannot be part of the formation of the
agreement, but must be an independent act, following the agree-
ment, to carry into effect the object of that agreement.78 Courts
have held that the act may be lawful in itself77 and that any
open act,78 in pursuance of the conspiracy, no matter how insignifi-
cant, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement.7 9
The new code's further requirement that an overt act must
be averred and proved as an element of the criminal conspiracy,
71. See Commonwealth v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Super. 410, 419, 24 A.2d 762,
764 (1942) (conspiracy to cheat and defraud insurance companies), citing
Commonwealth v. McKisson, 8 Serg. & R. 418, 420, 11 Am. Dec. 630 (Pa.
1822) (conspiracy to defraud a person of his chattel under false pretense):
An overt act is distinguished from that which rests merely
in intention or design; and as used in the law of conspiracy it
means an act done in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
In this Commonwealth, the common law rule prevails. No overt
act need be set forth on the indictment.
See also Commonwealth v. Richardson, 229 Pa. 609, 611, 79 A. 222, 224 (1911)
(conspiracy to bribe and corrupt councilmen in the performance of their
public duties).
72. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470, 490 (1903)
(conspiracy to extort money under color of office).
73. Id. See also Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 365-66 (1912).
74. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft
No. 10, at 141 (1960).
75. See note 71 supra.
76. See United States v. Grossman, 55 F.2d 408, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1931)
(conspiracy to violate National Prohibition Act). See also Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HIv. L. REV. 920, 946 (1959).
77. See Mifflin v. Commonwealth, 5 W. & S. 461, 464 (Pa. 1843) (con-
spiracy to effect escape of an infant); Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Bright,
36 (Pa. 1821) (conspiracy to fix wages).
78. See Commonwealth v. Cohen, 203 Pa. Super. 34, 199 A.2d 139,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964) (conspiracy to cheat and defraud a union
of its money, goods and property) wherein an overt act was defined as
an act which is done openly by one of the co-conspirators to accomplish
the purpose of the conspiracy.
79. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333-34 (1957) (attendance
at a meeting); United States v. Waldin, 138 F. Supp. 791, 794 (E.D. Pa.
1956) (demand for money for conspiratorial services).
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while affording somewhat greater protection to the rights of the
accused, should not substantially overburden the prosecutor. By
its very nature, conspiracy is secretive:80
Conspirators do not go out on the public highways and pro-
claim their purpose; their methods are devious, hidden,
secret and clandestine.
Conspiracy is, therefore, often difficult to prove by direct evidence
and the prosecution is usually forced to infer the agreement from
evidence of the conduct of the conspirators subsequent to that
agreement. 8' Thus Justice Maxey, in Commonwealth v. Strantz,
2
stated:
An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can
seldom, if ever, be proved and it need not be, for proof of a
criminal partnership is almost invariably extracted from
the circumstances that attend its activities.
The prosecution's task is therefore not unduly burdened under
the overt act requirement in the Crimes Code; theory now paral-
lels practice.
The general conspiracy provision s3 of the new Pennsylvania
Crimes Code goes a step further than the Model Penal Code in
its application of the overt act requirements. The overt act re-
quirement was introduced in both codes to afford at least mini-
mal assurance, beyond the naked agreement, that a socially dan-
gerous combination exists. The general conspiracy provision84 of
the Model Penal Code, however, excepts from this requirement
felonies of the first and second degree. Its draftsmen reasoned
that the added assurance of an overt act requirement can be dis-
pensed with when the crime which is the object of the conspiracy
80. See Marrash v. United States, 168 F. 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1909) (con-
spiracy to defraud the United States of money from import duties). See
also United States v. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (conspiracy to
sell whiskey above prices set by the Office of Price Administration) which
states:
Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful con-
spiracy. The more completely they are achieved, the more success-
ful the crime.
81. See Commonwealth v. Antico, 146 Pa. Super. 293, 325, 22 A.2d 204,
219 (1941).
82. 328 Pa. 33, 43, 195 A. 75, 80 (1937) (conspiracy to commit mur-
der).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 903(e) (Supp. 1973).
84. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 5.03(5) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) provides:
Overt Act. No person may be convicted of conspiracy to
commit a crime, other than a felony of the first or second degree,
unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and
proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he
conspired (emphasis added).
is grave enough and the importance of preventive interference is
pro tanto greater than in dealing with less serious offenses.8 5 Not-
withstanding this, the Pennsylvania code makes no exceptions to
the requirement of having to aver and prove an overt act to sus-
tain a conspiracy conviction. In so doing, the Pennsylvania drafts-
men place greater stress on "lessening the dangers of unjust
prosecutions" as a means of balancing the rights of the accused
with those of society.88
D. Attention Paid to Procedural Matters Inherent
in Conspiracy Prosecutions
The 1973 Code details certain procedural areas inherent in
conspiracy prosecutions which were wholly absent from the 1939
Code. By specifying that a defendant may only be charged in the
county in which he entered into the conspiracy or in one where
he or his fellow conspirators carried out an overt act pursuant
to such conspiracy,8 7 the new code insures that the defendant
will be accorded his constitutional right to "a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage."8 8  The new provision
is thus in keeping with the common law of Pennsylvania. 9 It at-
tempts to assure that in complicated cases wherein there are a
number of separate conspiracies, venue as to every conspiracy
with which each defendant is charged will not be laid on the
basis of an overt act done pursuant to a different conspiracy or by
a person with whom he did not conspire. This provision thus aug-
ments the general purposes9" of the new code:
(2) To safeguard conduct that is without fault from con-
demnation as criminal.
(5) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between ser-
ious and minor offenses, and to differentiate among of-
fenders with a view to a just individualization in their
treatement.
The subsection 91 on joinder of defendants exemplifies the
1973 Code's successful reconciliation of the rights of the public with
those of the accused. The needs of the prosecution in dealing with
organized criminality are strengthened by allowing joinder of de-
85. Id. at 141.
86. 1973 Pennsylvania Crimes Code, Draftsmen's Notes, at 10. This
is in keeping with the purposes of the title as announced in PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 104 (Supp. 1973).
87. Id. § 903 (d) (2) (i) (Supp. 1973).
88. PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9 (1874).
89. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160, 189 A.2d 255 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Petrosky, 194 Pa. Super. 94, 166 A.2d 682 (1961) (con-
spiracy to obtain money from the Commonwealth under fraudulent pre-
tenses).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 104(2) (5) (Supp. 1973).
91. Id. § 903(d).
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fendants under specific circumstances: when two defendants are
charged with conspiring with one another or if two conspiracies
are so related that they constitute different aspects of a scheme of
organized criminal conduct. This permits the prosecution to pre-
sent in one trial all the aspects of a single complex scheme. At
the same time, the rights of the individual defendant are safe-
guarded by permitting the court, in the discretion of the judge to
promote a fair trial, to order a severance or take a special verdict as
to any defendant who so requests.
92
E. Punishment is Made to Fit the Crime
The Crimes Code's provisions on the grading of conspiracy,
93
mitigation,9 4 and multiple convictions barred9 5 represent a more
enlightened approach to the punishment of criminal conspiracy.
Under the 1939 Code the convicted conspirator was guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to a maximum fine of $500 and/or up to
two years imprisonment,9 irrespective of the substantive offense
which was the object of the conspiracy, be it murder or trespass.
The new code, however, provides that the penalty for conspiracy,
as for criminal attempt and solicitation, be the same as for the
most serious offense which is its object.9 7 Whereas the overall
deterrent effect of such increased punishments may be negligible,
considering that the actor probably ignores the threat of punish-
ment for the crime which is the object of the conspiracy anyway,
nevertheless they are an improvement over the blanket provision
of the 1939 Code which made no attempt to calibrate the punish-
ment to the purpose for which the conspiracy was formed. Be-
cause of this uncertain deterrent effect the new code economizes
when first degree felonies are the object of the conspiracy, by
making the conspiracy punishable only as a second degree felony.
It is therefore hoped that sentencing provisions for second degree
felonies will suffice to meet whatever danger is presented by the
actor. In order to temper the harsher sentences that could con-
ceivably be meted out under the 1973 Code, the subsection9" on
92. Id. § 903 (d) (2) (iii).
93. Id. § 905(a).
94. Id. § 905(b).
95. Id. § 906.
96. Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 302, [1939] Pa. Laws 872 (repealed
1973). See note 3 supra.
97. An exception to this is that conspiracy to commit murder of the
first degree or to commit a felony of the first degree, amounts to a felony
of the second degree. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 905 (b) (Supp. 1973).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 905(b) (Supp. 1973).
mitigation allows the court discretion to dismiss the prosecution
if the defendant's conduct has not created any public danger. Sim-
ilarly, the section on multiple convictions9 9 also tempers the ef-
fects of the increased penalties, by barring conviction for more
than one inchoate crime (attempt, solicitation or conspiracy) for
conduct designed to commit or culminate in the commission of the
same crime. This provision reflects the policy of finding the evil
of preparatory action in the danger that it may culminate in the
substantive offense that is its object. Thus conceived, there is little
reason to cumulate convictions for attempt, solicitation and con-
spiracy to commit the same crime.
In its sentencing provisions, the code likewise emphasizes
predictability. While the sentences may be stronger than the
$500/two year sanctions in the 1939 Code, their severity is dimin-
ished by barring multiple convictions for the same criminal object
and by permitting the judge, in his discretion, to dismiss a prose-
cution altogether, if he finds no general danger emanating from
an individual defendant's conduct. In this way, the rights of both
society and the accused are protected in a definitive fashion, found
neither in the 1939 Code nor at common law.
100
IV. CONCLUSION
The crime of conspiracy was initially created to punish the
specific evil of malicious and false prosecution. With succeeding
centuries came a realization that the conspiratorial combination
per se often presented a general danger to society far worse
than that of its object. To combat this broader threat, the crime
of conspiracy was expanded to include agreements to accomplish
any crime. Eventually, as in the 1939 Code, the crime of con-
spiracy was further extended to encompass just about anything
that smacked of dishonesty, malice or unlawfulness.
But in seeking to stave off the general danger inherent in
the conspiratorial confederation, the law, both in decision and
statute, grew overbroad and vague. Imprecision in drafting the
law led to unpredictability. Unpredictability, in turn, engendered
judicial subjectivity in its enforcement, prosecutorial unfairness,
confusion in the admission of evidence and consequent prejudice
to the rights of the individual defendant. The 1973 Pennsylvania
Crimes Code has, therefore, come as a much needed restraint to
the vigorous, unchecked growth which the crime of conspiracy
has undergone in the last six hundred and fifty years. The new
code limits the offense to conspiracy to commit a crime, shifts the
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 906 (Supp. 1973).
100. For a discussion of specific object versus general danger ration-
ales for punishment provisions in criminal conspiracy statutes, see Note,




focus of the law from the conduct of the group to that of the in-
dividual conspirator, requires that an overt act in pursuance of
the conspiracy be averred and proved, pays closer attention to
procedural complications in mass conspiracy trials, and grades the
punishment to fit the substantive crime planned as the object of
the conspiratorial agreement. In so doing, the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code has provided a statutory basis upon which the rights
of the individual accused to a fair trial may be more equitably bal-
anced against the general interest of preserving the safety of so-
ciety. It is hoped that the general conspiracy provisions of the new
code, comprehensive as they are, will prove both an effective and
durable response to the challenge put forward by an early cham-
pion of the civil rights of the accused:
If there are still any citizens interested in protecting hu-
man liberty, let them study the conspiracy laws of the
United States.01 '
JAY ROBERT STIEFEL
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